Two anniversaries (the 50th and 35th) of “independence declarations” were celebrated in two provinces last week amid political tension and uncertainty: Papua on Dec. 1 and Aceh on Dec. 4.
Has Indonesia, which forged a national identity over the archipelago, become a state of multiple nations, or is it a challenge that will pass?
In fact, a facade of would-be nations has appeared many times much earlier.
A decade ago, I witnessed the same commemorations in the village of Jim Jim, Pidie, Aceh (Dec. 4, 1999) and at Taman Imbri at the historic Jl. Martin Indey in Jayapura (Port Numbay), Papua (Dec. 1, 2000). Both events, rather than exclusively held for rebel supporters, actually involved local leaders and common folk as well.
Interestingly, then Aceh rebels used the azan (Islamic call to prayer) as a “national anthem” whereas the Papuans sang “Hai Tanahku Papua” (Hello Papua, My Homeland) and praised Dec. 1 as “the day Jesus was born”.
The rituals implied that to build a “home” (read: state) for an “oppressed” and “suffering” nation is equal — hence, as important as — to starting a divinely blessed spiritual journey. However, despite the religiously inspired events, both celebrations actually harbored aspirations of a secular state.
Therefore, the most important thing here is not the nature of the dream (the ideal state), but the profoundly intense exercise of being — not Indonesian, but — respectively Acehnese and Papuan.
The two events had in common a spiritual and emotional mass gathering, which attempted to forge a national identity. In both cases, the mass celebrations thus became an experience of having nationhood;
of being a nation-in-the-making, that is.
From an anthropological perspective, the significance of such meaningful events should be duly recognized. It is this kind of imagining of a community of their own — even while still lacking a state of their own — that seemed crucial here.
A decade on, identity politics has become important, perhaps even stronger. At the same time, though, peace has been and is now largely kept in place as special autonomy is implemented in both Aceh and Papua. The claim of being a nation may thus become real, rather than simply “separatist” rhetoric.
For Papua, this has been the result of popular discontent which has evoked Papuan common sentiments as a separate racial i.e. Melanesian group — a category based on racial classification imposed by the Dutch colonial system, later strengthened by Javanese-cum-militarized style of Soeharto’s New Order centralism.
Papua is a tribal civilization — a conglomerate of hundreds of tribal groupings as diverse as Indonesia, which, thanks to Dutch paternalism and the New Order’s oppression, has nurtured its own nationhood.
Papuan protests today, then, may be viewed as a consequence of the ongoing denial of Papua’s recent political history in its relationship with the central administration, and of social marginalization at home.
Hence, recent massive strikes, violent clashes and the absence of honest dialogue with Jakarta will only strengthen Papuan self-perception as a nation.
For Aceh, the local pride of being a nation has always been strong, since it is rooted in Aceh’s centuries-old state-making history.
It is true, no open conflict occurred with Jakarta since the 2005 Helsinki peace accord, which identified the warring sides as dignified partners. This was seen as an important milestone, implying acknowledgment of Aceh as a nation in itself.
Two issues have disturbed the current peace in Aceh. The first is a series of covert attacks under the guise of maintaining security that occurred throughout 2009. Second, and the most recent issue, is regional elections. It’s an open secret that the military has long been suspicious of the disbanded rebel group. Serious clashes have since emerged between a small of faction of the current governor and the Aceh Party that controls the local legislative council.
The Constitutional Court’s eventual decision to allow the governor to participate as an independent candidate in the elections, and the resulting attacks targeting him and his supporters have shocked Aceh.
This — amid corruption involving Jakarta big business — is seen as — rightly or wrongly — an attempt to undermine former rebels’ political power. Worse, it might endanger the hard-won Helsinki pact.
Basically, these are the prices we pay as we cling to the legacy and militarized-style of a unitary state. In fact, we are still preoccupied with oneness, a sacred state of a single nation, such that any departure from this is seen as taboo and separatist.
This discourse has misled us into a besieged state of predisposition, armed with a doctrine-turned-military jargon “NKRI Harga Mati” (Unitary State, or Death!) that took hundreds of thousands of lives in Aceh, Papua and East Timor. In effect, rather than preventing separatism, it encouraged it.
It has been argued that the failure of civilian politics has opened the way toward military intervention and dictatorship. Indonesia’s experience with rebellions, however, shows precisely that the military approach led to state centralism and has proven counterproductive in terms of unity and nationhood.
With all that, plus the occupation (of Timor Leste) that violated our Constitution — why then do we hardly question the nature of our nationalist fervor and nationhood?
Most Indonesians would presumably love to have the nation-state remaining intact from Sabang to Merauke, but, to some, not at any price.
A fledging democracy should not be blind. It should focus nation-building as a project which looks forward rather than building on myths of past grandeur, respects the diversity of ethnicities, local histories and even nationalities rather than oneness, and integrates societies rather than mere territories.
Has Indonesia, which forged a national identity over the archipelago, become a state of multiple nations, or is it a challenge that will pass?
In fact, a facade of would-be nations has appeared many times much earlier.
A decade ago, I witnessed the same commemorations in the village of Jim Jim, Pidie, Aceh (Dec. 4, 1999) and at Taman Imbri at the historic Jl. Martin Indey in Jayapura (Port Numbay), Papua (Dec. 1, 2000). Both events, rather than exclusively held for rebel supporters, actually involved local leaders and common folk as well.
Interestingly, then Aceh rebels used the azan (Islamic call to prayer) as a “national anthem” whereas the Papuans sang “Hai Tanahku Papua” (Hello Papua, My Homeland) and praised Dec. 1 as “the day Jesus was born”.
The rituals implied that to build a “home” (read: state) for an “oppressed” and “suffering” nation is equal — hence, as important as — to starting a divinely blessed spiritual journey. However, despite the religiously inspired events, both celebrations actually harbored aspirations of a secular state.
Therefore, the most important thing here is not the nature of the dream (the ideal state), but the profoundly intense exercise of being — not Indonesian, but — respectively Acehnese and Papuan.
The two events had in common a spiritual and emotional mass gathering, which attempted to forge a national identity. In both cases, the mass celebrations thus became an experience of having nationhood;
of being a nation-in-the-making, that is.
From an anthropological perspective, the significance of such meaningful events should be duly recognized. It is this kind of imagining of a community of their own — even while still lacking a state of their own — that seemed crucial here.
A decade on, identity politics has become important, perhaps even stronger. At the same time, though, peace has been and is now largely kept in place as special autonomy is implemented in both Aceh and Papua. The claim of being a nation may thus become real, rather than simply “separatist” rhetoric.
For Papua, this has been the result of popular discontent which has evoked Papuan common sentiments as a separate racial i.e. Melanesian group — a category based on racial classification imposed by the Dutch colonial system, later strengthened by Javanese-cum-militarized style of Soeharto’s New Order centralism.
Papua is a tribal civilization — a conglomerate of hundreds of tribal groupings as diverse as Indonesia, which, thanks to Dutch paternalism and the New Order’s oppression, has nurtured its own nationhood.
Papuan protests today, then, may be viewed as a consequence of the ongoing denial of Papua’s recent political history in its relationship with the central administration, and of social marginalization at home.
Hence, recent massive strikes, violent clashes and the absence of honest dialogue with Jakarta will only strengthen Papuan self-perception as a nation.
For Aceh, the local pride of being a nation has always been strong, since it is rooted in Aceh’s centuries-old state-making history.
It is true, no open conflict occurred with Jakarta since the 2005 Helsinki peace accord, which identified the warring sides as dignified partners. This was seen as an important milestone, implying acknowledgment of Aceh as a nation in itself.
Two issues have disturbed the current peace in Aceh. The first is a series of covert attacks under the guise of maintaining security that occurred throughout 2009. Second, and the most recent issue, is regional elections. It’s an open secret that the military has long been suspicious of the disbanded rebel group. Serious clashes have since emerged between a small of faction of the current governor and the Aceh Party that controls the local legislative council.
The Constitutional Court’s eventual decision to allow the governor to participate as an independent candidate in the elections, and the resulting attacks targeting him and his supporters have shocked Aceh.
This — amid corruption involving Jakarta big business — is seen as — rightly or wrongly — an attempt to undermine former rebels’ political power. Worse, it might endanger the hard-won Helsinki pact.
Basically, these are the prices we pay as we cling to the legacy and militarized-style of a unitary state. In fact, we are still preoccupied with oneness, a sacred state of a single nation, such that any departure from this is seen as taboo and separatist.
This discourse has misled us into a besieged state of predisposition, armed with a doctrine-turned-military jargon “NKRI Harga Mati” (Unitary State, or Death!) that took hundreds of thousands of lives in Aceh, Papua and East Timor. In effect, rather than preventing separatism, it encouraged it.
It has been argued that the failure of civilian politics has opened the way toward military intervention and dictatorship. Indonesia’s experience with rebellions, however, shows precisely that the military approach led to state centralism and has proven counterproductive in terms of unity and nationhood.
With all that, plus the occupation (of Timor Leste) that violated our Constitution — why then do we hardly question the nature of our nationalist fervor and nationhood?
Most Indonesians would presumably love to have the nation-state remaining intact from Sabang to Merauke, but, to some, not at any price.
A fledging democracy should not be blind. It should focus nation-building as a project which looks forward rather than building on myths of past grandeur, respects the diversity of ethnicities, local histories and even nationalities rather than oneness, and integrates societies rather than mere territories.
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